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Abstract
This paper analyzes the distortions that banks’ cross-border activities, such as foreign as-
sets, deposits and equity, can introduce into regulatory interventions. We find that while each
individual dimension of cross-border activities distorts the incentives of a domestic regulator, a
balanced amount of cross-border activities does not necessarily cause inefficiencies, as the var-
ious distortions can offset each other. Empirical analysis using bank-level data from the recent
crisis provides support to our theoretical findings. Specifically, banks with a higher share of for-
eign deposits and assets and a lower foreign equity share were intervened at a more fragile state,
reflecting the distorted incentives of national regulators. We discuss several implications for the
supervision of cross-border banks in Europe.
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1 Introduction
The problematic resolution of failing cross-border banks in Europe during the current crisis has fo-
cused academics’ and policy makers’ attention alike on the misalignment of geographic boundaries of
banks and their supervision. The resolution of Fortis on the national level, undertaken separately by
Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg authorities has confirmed Charles Goodhart’s and Mervyn King’s
point that "banks are international in life and national in death." The failure of the Icelandic banks,
with wide-ranging economic and political repercussions has shed doubts on the viability of large
multinational banks in small countries. The recent reform debate has - among other items - focused
on issues of national versus supra-national supervision, the responsibility, obligation and capacity of
home country supervisor relative to host country supervisor to resolve large cross-border banks and,
in general, the need to coordinate the resolution of large international banks across borders. On the
political level, arguments over national sovereignty and the role of European institutions are being
used to argue in favor or against the establishment of a European-level bank supervisory authority.
But what are the distortions of national supervision of international banks? What are the rationales be-
hind national and supra-national supervisors; what are the trade-offs of national versus supra-national
resolution authority?
This paper first presents a simple theoretical model that demonstrates the distorted incentives
that national supervisors face when deciding to intervene in failing banks with activity outside their
borders. Specifically, we show that national supervisors’ incentives to intervene in a timely manner
into a weak bank increase in the foreign equity share and decrease in the share of foreign deposits and
assets. The intuition for this result is, chiefly, that the gains from letting a weak bank continue mainly
accrue to equity, while the costs accrue to debt holders and other stakeholders in the economy. The
result is robust to variations in the utility function of the regulator, endogenizing risk choice by banks
and type of intervention (bank closure or bailout). Second, we provide empirical evidence consistent
with the model using a sample of intervened banks during the crisis of 2007-2009. Taking their CDS
spread at the time of intervention as a measure of regulatory lenience, we find that higher foreign
asset and deposit shares and a lower foreign equity share are associated with more lenient regulatory
decisions.1 These findings are robust to including an array of bank-level and country-level control
1Although not the focus of our analysis, we also find that cross-border activities affect the likelihood of bank interven-
tion consistent with the idea that regulators are more lenient when a larger share of the gains from continuation accrue
domestically.
variables, testing for anticipation effects and controlling for selection bias. We link our theoretical
and empirical analysis to a discussion of the current regulatory arrangements for cross-border banking
in Europe and recent reform discussions.
Our paper is related to a small but growing theoretical literature on the regulation of cross-border
banks.2 Loranth and Morrison (2007) discuss the implications of capital requirements and deposit
insurance for cross-border banks and show that capital requirements set at a level to off-set the safety
net subsidy of deposit insurance result in too little risk-taking in the case of multinational banks.
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006) show that competition between national regulators can lead to lower
capital adequacy standards, since national regulators do not take into account the external benefits of
higher capital adequacy standards in terms of higher stability in other countries. A supra-national
central regulator is therefore more likely to emerge among more homogeneous countries if it sets
regulatory standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Acharya
(2003), however, shows that coordinating capital adequacy ratios across countries without coordinat-
ing on other dimensions of the regulatory framework, such as resolution policies, can have detrimental
effects. Freixas (2003) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) show that ex-post negotiations on re-
capitalization of failing cross-border banks can lead to underprovision of the necessary resources and
prove the advantage of ex-ante burden sharing agreements in helping overcome coordination prob-
lems between regulators. Holthausen and Ronde (2002) consider cooperation between home and
host country supervisor on the intervention decision for a multinational bank. Given that national
regulators represent national interests, a misalignment of interests leads to suboptimal exchange of
information and distorted intervention decisions. Our paper is most closely related to Calzolari and
Loranth (2011) who show how the organization structure of multi-national banks can influence reg-
ulatory behavior. Specifically, organization of foreign presence through branches leads to higher
incentives to intervene as the home country regulator can draw on all assets, while at the same time
it reduces the incentives if the regulator is responsible for repaying all deposits, including in foreign
branches. There is also a more institutionally oriented literature on legal differences across countries
in the treatment of domestic and foreign creditors (e.g. Krimminger, 2007). Osterloo and Schoen-
maker (2007) and Schoenmaker (2010) discuss the importance of regulation of cross-border banks
within Europe. Allen et al. (2011) discuss policy options for the regulation of cross-border banks
2For an early discussion, see White (1994).
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in the European Union. The contribution of our paper is to show that different dimensions of cross-
border activities can result in different distortions of national regulators when deciding to intervene
in a weak cross-border bank. Unlike previous work, we therefore distinguish specifically between the
equity, deposit and asset dimensions of cross-border bank activities and show their different impact
on intervention decisions by national regulators. Unlike previous papers, we explicitly test our the-
oretical predictions, using data from the recent crisis. Finally, we embed both theoretical model and
the empirical findings into the current discussion on the revamping of the European financial safety
net.
The resolution of cross-border banks during the recent crisis is consistent with our theoretical
analysis. Intervention into large cross-border banks came often at a late stage and often with conflicts
between home and host country supervisors. While the lack of an effective bank resolution framework
in most European countries was certainly an important factor in explaining the late and uncoordinated
intervention into failing bank, incentives for domestic regulators facing weak international banks have
played an important role as well (Claessens et al., 2010). This became most obvious in the case
of Fortis, a Benelux based cross-border bank that was split up along national lines for resolution
purposes. Similarly, the late intervention into the Icelandic banks likely reflects not only lack of
regulatory strength and competence but also distorted incentives of national regulators.3
This paper contributes to the literature on regulation of cross-border banks by focusing on one
specific aspect, the intervention decision of supervisors. While the previous literature has focused
on capital regulations and deposit insurance across borders, this paper analyzes the implications of
cross-border banking for the intervention into failing banks. In focusing on this specific aspect, we
hold constant other elements, such as capital requirements and deposit insurance. We also abstract
from market discipline to focus exclusively on supervisory discipline. While the basic set-up of this
model is similar to Calzolari and Loranth (2011), we differ along several dimensions, including the
distinction between cross-border activities in terms of assets, deposits and equity. In addition, we
provide empirical evidence on regulatory bias in intervention decisions during the recent crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses trends in cross-
border banking across Europe and the development of the corresponding regulatory frameworks. Sec-
tion 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis. The final section
3For an in-depth discussion of the recent Icelandic crisis, see Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega (2011).
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derives policy conclusions.
2 Cross-border banking in Europe - trends and regulations
Cross-border banking has gained importance across Europe in recent decades, as part of a larger
globalization wave in financial services. Even more impressive has been the transformation of many
banking systems in Central and Eastern Europe, which went from state-owned mono-bank systems to
foreign-bank dominated systems within a period of 10 years. Figure 1 illustrates this trend towards
increasing importance of cross-border banks across European financial systems. Hand in hand with
an increase in cross-border banking went an increase in bank concentration. As reported by Cihak
and Decressin (2007), before the crisis 16 large cross-border financial institutions accounted for about
one third of EU banking assets. The trend towards cross-border banking can also be illustrated for
individual banks in Europe. The percentage of foreign assets in total assets is 82 percent for Deutsche
Bank, 64 percent for Santander, 62 percent for UniCredit, 41 percent for BNP Paribas and 29 percent
for Societe Generale (Allen et al., 2011).
The patterns of cross-border banking, however, are very different in the “old” EU member coun-
tries of Western Europe and the new EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Financial
integration in Western Europe has been a more gradual process though at accelerated speed over the
past decade. The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking
Directive was a decisive step towards a Unified European Financial Market, which subsequently led
to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation across member countries. The introduction
of the Euro in 1999 eliminated currency risk and provided a further push for financial integration
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010). In addition to cross-border lending, the increase in financial integration
also came in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Among the most high-profile cases
were the take-over of Hypobank in Germany by the Italian Unicredito, the takeover of the British
Abbey National by the Spanish Santander and the takeover of the Dutch ABN Amro Bank in 2007 by
Fortis (Belgium), Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander.
While Western European countries have been both home and host of large cross-border banks,
Central and Eastern Europe has been exclusively host of such banks. The ownership transformation
of the banking system, from a state-owned mono-bank system towards a privately owned market-
based financial system was key to achieving macroeconomic stability in the late 1990s, with countries
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finalizing the ownership transformation process the fastest also being the first ones to successfully
emerge out of the systemic banking crises of the 1990s.
The expansion of banks across national borders has raised the issue of regulatory and supervi-
sory responsibility. Across the world and in Europe, primary responsibility for bank regulation and
supervision lies with national authorities, even after the recent crisis. In the context of European
financial integration, the Second Banking Directive of 1993 introduced home-country control and
mutual recognition, resulting in a “single passport” for branching across the EU: any bank licensed in
an EU country is allowed to open branches in other EU countries provided it meets some common,
minimum standards. In spite of this, however, many banks still choose to establish subsidiaries with
separate capital, which might be driven by bank specific factors and country circumstances (Cerrutti
et al., 2007). On the supervisory level, Memorandums of Understanding and colleges of supervisors
for specific banks have become a common tool of cooperation across borders. However, in spite of
regulatory convergence and increased supervisory cooperation in the early 2000s, important differ-
ences remained across EU countries in regulatory frameworks, supervisory standards and especially
in bank resolution frameworks. Most countries did not have bank-specific insolvency frameworks,
which limited the options towards failing banks during the crisis to either liquidation in regular bank-
ruptcy procedures with all the interruptions that such a long drawn-out process would bring with it or
bailout with tax-payer money.
The crisis of 2008 has clearly shown the deficiencies of both national resolution frameworks, but
especially of cross-border resolution frameworks. The Dutch-Belgian Fortis bank is a good example
for that. In 2007, the Belgian Fortis was allowed to participate in the take-over of Dutch ABN Amro in
spite of already facing solvency problems, which points to both regulatory capture in Belgium and the
lack of information exchange between Belgian and Dutch supervisors. The conflict between Belgian
and Dutch supervisors following the take-over about who would be lead supervisor of Fortis made
cooperation during the subsequent crisis in 2008 difficult. Initial coordinated recapitalization failed to
calm the markets, which resulted in each national government taking their own actions, ultimately not
only nationalizing resolution of the individual bank pieces in Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands,
but nationalizing the banks themselves. Insiders stress that cooperation ultimately broke down when
the Ministers of Finance got involved.
Another, very different, example are the Icelandic banks. The late intervention by the Icelandic
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supervisors is consistent with the theoretical model presented below and can be explained by the
high shares of foreign assets and deposits that Icelandic banks were holding, while equity was almost
exclusively held by domestic agents. The fact that a large share of deposits were collected through
branches rather than subsidiaries exacerbated the situation for host country supervisors as they had
little information and even less power to intervene in time.
In the wake of the crisis, attempts have been made to address these deficiencies both on the na-
tional but also on the European level. The De Larosière Report (2009) acknowledged the need for
better coordination among Member States, in order to allow for a well-functioning Single Market
in banking, without recommending, however, full centralization of EU regulation and supervision.
Following the report, the European Banking Authority (EBA) was established to more intensively
coordinate micro-regulation issues, while the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is in charge
of addressing macro-prudential issues. Among other tasks, the EBA is charged to facilitate agree-
ment between national supervisory authorities, where necessary settling any disagreements, including
within colleges of supervisors, to ensure supervisors take a more coordinated approach. On the other
hand, the EBA does not have any direct supervisory power over banks and cannot legally force the
intervention into weak banks or specific resolution techniques.
Further reaching reform suggestions, such as creating a European-level supervisor with interven-
tion powers or a European deposit insurance fund with resolution powers modeled after the U.S. FDIC
or the Canadian CDIC were rejected. Explanations are manifold; one institutional explanation is the
principle of subsidiarity which states that policy areas can only be transferred to the European level
if they cannot be undertaken at the national level. There is also a political economy argument that
banking is considered too critical a sector for individual countries to delegate regulatory powers to
a supranational level. In addition, resolution of large banks often involves taxpayer money; trans-
ferring the authority to commit taxpayers’ money to the European level is seen as violating national
sovereignty. Finally, there is the legal challenge that a new institution cannot be created without a
new European treaty, which is politically difficult. While these political and constitutional constraints
continue to weight against a supranational supervisor on the European level, the Eurozone’s reaction
to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis with more fiscal centralization on the European level suggests
that these constraints might lose weight over time.
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3 Theoretical analysis
We present a simple model of bank supervision, with three periods, 0, 1 and 2. For ease of analysis,
we assume that the discount factor and the deposit interest rate are zero.4 There is a single repre-
sentative bank whose balance sheet is normalized to 1 and that issues debt d and equity k, so that
d+ k = 1. In period 0, the bank invests its resources into an investment project whose success is ran-
dom and outside the control of the bank. Specifically, with probability  ( 2 (0; 1)), the investment
succeeds and yields a return R>1 in period 2, and with probability 1  , the project fails and yields
zero gross return in period 2.
While the supervisor has imperfect information about  at date 0,5  becomes known at date 1.
Based on this information, a supervisor can decide whether to intervene in the bank or to allow it to
continue. If the supervisor decides to intervene in the bank, she can recover the initial investment of
one. This intervention can take different forms, ranging from liquidation to a purchase and assumption
operation involving another bank. If the supervisor decides to not intervene and allows the bank to
continue to period 2, with probability  , the bank will be successful and be able to repay its debt and
equity holders. With probability 1  , the bank will fail and there are external costs of c.6
We assume that the supervisor maximizes domestic welfare, consisting of the returns to domestic
debt, equity minus domestic external costs (we will relax this assumption below). In the case of
a purely domestic bank, her intervention decision will hence coincide with the one that maximizes
(world) welfare. The intervention threshold is given by the  which equates the expected returns from
continuation with the return from immediate liquidation. We have
R  (1  )c = 1. (1)
Solving for  gives
 =
1 + c
R+ c
: (2)
Quite intuitively, we can see that intervention becomes more likely when bank failure costs, c; increase
4The deposit rate itself does not matter. What matters though is that it is risk-insensitive, for example, because there is
deposit insurance with a flat premium.
5Since the supervisor takes actions at date 1 only, the nature of date-0 uncertainty is irrelevant.
6For a discussion on the external costs that bank failure can impose on the remaining financial system and the real
economy, see Beck (2011). In principle, intervention at date 1 may also incur some costs, however, we would think that
such costs are of orders lowers than the ones arising from bank failure at date 2. Including external costs in period 1 does
not change the main conclusions of our model under reasonable parameterizations.
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(the latter follows from 0(c) > 0 forR > 1). By contrast, a higher returnR reduces the intervention
probability.
While we assume throughout the paper that  becomes perfectly known at date 1, we can easily
introduce a noisy signal on . As long as the signal is symmetrically distributed around the true ,
the intervention threshold is the same. This can be seen by noting that the benefits from continuation
are linear in  (left hand side of equation 1).
3.1 The Incentives of a National Supervisor with Cross-Border Banking
We now introduce cross-border banking into our model. For this we allow the bank to be partially
financed by foreign deposits and foreign equity, as well as having asset holdings abroad. More specif-
ically we denote with D the foreign share of deposits, with E the foreign share of equity and with
A the share of foreign firms (assets) financed by the bank.
The introduction of cross-border banking obviously does not modify the efficient intervention
threshold as it does not affect total payoffs in the world economy (thus including foreigners). It only
affects the share of the payoffs that accrue to domestic agents. As national supervisors only care about
domestic payoffs, this can change the intervention incentives for the domestic supervisor and drive a
wedge between the socially efficient and the domestic intervention point.
The domestic intervention point can be derived as follows. As before, if the domestic regulator
intervenes at the intermediate date, the bank will be liquidated. Total (world) proceeds from this
are 1. Domestic depositors obtain (1   D)d and domestic equity obtains (1   E)(1   d) of these
proceeds. Total payoff in the domestic economy is thus (1 D)d+(1 E)(1 d). In case there is no
intervention the bank succeeds with probability . In this case domestic depositors obtain (1 D)d,
while equity obtains (1 E)(R d). With probability 1  the bank fails. In this case both equity and
debt holders do not obtain any return and the country in addition suffers (1 A)c due to bank failure
costs. Total expected domestic payoff is hence ((1 D)d+(1 E)(R d))  (1 )(1 A)c.
The domestic intervention threshold is defined by
((1  D)d+ (1  E)(R  d))  (1  )(1  A)c = (1  D)d+ (1  E)(1  d). (3)
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Rearranging for  gives
b = (1  D)d+ (1  E)(1  d) + (1  A)c
(1  D)d+ (1  E)(R  d) + (1  A)c
. (4)
Note that for D = E = A we obtain b = . That is, when the resident balance sheet is
proportional to the entire balance sheet of the bank, liquidation decisions are efficient. Thus, if the
cross-border ownership share equals the other two cross-border shares, the domestic regulator always
takes efficient decisions regardless of the overall level of cross-border activities. The intuition for this
is straightforward: if cross-border engagement is the same along all three dimensions, the domestic
regulator will simply perceive a fraction of both benefits and costs of intervention. Since this fraction
is the same for the costs and benefits, her decision will not be distorted.
We next derive comparative statics for the intervention threshold with respect to the various do-
mestic shares..
Proposition 1 . The intervention threshold of the domestic supervisor, D, is
i) decreasing in the share of foreign deposits D,
ii) increasing in the share of foreign equity E ,
iii) decreasing in the share of foreign assets A.
Proof. Follows from taking the derivative of the intervention threshold b with respect to D,E and
A.
The intuition behind these results is as follows.
Deposits. Since the national regulator only cares about domestic depositors, a higher share of
foreign deposits will reduce the costs for her in period 2 and thus make intervention in period 1 less
likely. A higher share of domestic deposits, in turn, makes the domestic regulator less inclined to
gamble on bank success in the second period. Hence, with a higher share of domestic deposits, the
domestic regulator becomes more likely to intervene, that is, the range of 0swhere intervention takes
place increases.
Equity. Shareholders have a relatively higher interest in continuing the bank due to the standard
risk-shifting problems (the costs of bank failure are partly borne by debt holders and firms). A higher
share of domestic shareholders aligns the interests of the regulator more with the one of shareholders.
This makes interventions less likely, that is, the threshold decreases. If, on the other hand, the share
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of foreign equity holders is higher, the regulator is more likely to intervene in period 1.
Assets. When a higher share of bank assets is domestically invested, this raises the domestic
external costs of bank failure. This, in turn, makes the domestic regulator more averse to continuation.
As a result, she becomes stricter at date 1 (the minimum required success probability increases). On
the other hand, a higher share of foreign assets involves that a higher share of external costs in period
2 are being borne by agents outside the home economy, which makes the regulator more reluctant to
intervene in period 1.
Note that the comparative statics are a direct consequence of the fact that in our model the gains
from continuation accrue at the margin to equity at the cost of the other two stakeholders. If this fea-
ture is modified, the comparative statics may change. For example, there might be a cost of liquidation
also at date 1. If this cost is mainly borne by debtors (or affects primarily the holders of assets), equity
may (in relative terms) lose when the bank is continued. Similarly, continuation incentives may be
reversed in the presence of a (large) interest rate on debt that only accrues at date 2 (thus only when
the bank is not liquidated at date 1). In such situations our comparative static results may no longer
hold.
Proposition 1 has straightforward welfare implications. We know that for D = E = A = 1,
domestic and efficient liquidation thresholds coincide. Since we also know, for example, that the
domestic liquidation threshold is increasing in the share of domestic deposits, it follows that when
D > 0 and E = A = 0 we have b < . This implies that there is a range of  ( 2 [b; ])
where it is efficient to liquidate but the domestic supervisor decides to let the bank continue to operate
(the domestic regulator is then too lenient).
The following corollary summarizes this welfare result, alongside with the corresponding ones
for foreign equity and assets.
Corollary 1 . When there is cross-border banking, domestic and efficient interventions generally do
not coincide. In particular we have:
i) If cross-border banking takes place only via deposits (D > 0 and E = A = 0): there are
ranges for  where the domestic regulator lets the bank continue even though this is inefficient (the
domestic regulator is too lenient);
i) If cross-border banking takes place only via equity (E > 0 and D = A = 0): there are
ranges for  where the domestic regulator liquidates the bank even though this is inefficient (the
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domestic regulator is too strict);
iii) If cross-border banking takes place only via assets (A > 0 and D = E = 0): there are
ranges for  where the domestic regulator lets the bank continue even though this is inefficient (the
domestic regulator is too lenient):
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1 and b =  for D = E = A = 0.
If cross-border banking takes place through more than one channel, the welfare results obviously
depend on the strength of each channel. For example, if there are both cross-ownership of deposits
and equity, the biases created by each channel go in opposite directions and hence tend to offset each
other. If there is mainly foreign deposit-taking but little foreign ownership, we are then likely to end
up with a too lenient domestic regulator, and vice versa. This implies that in order to evaluate the
efficiency properties of cross-border banking, one has to look at all aspects of cross-border banking
jointly, and not only at one channel in isolation.
3.2 Discussion
Our analysis focuses exclusively on cross-border activities as the source of inefficient liquidation
decisions. It is for this reason that we have assumed that intervention decisions maximize domestic
welfare. There are several reasons why even in the domestic case regulatory interventions are not
efficient. In their presence, the distortions induced by cross-border banking have to be evaluated
relative to these inefficiencies.
3.2.1 Objectives of the Regulator
We have assumed that the domestic authority responsible for the intervention decision maximizes the
returns to all domestic stakeholders. If this is not the case, other distortions can arise, which can either
strengthen or weaken the initial bias. If, for example, the authority which decides on interventions
is the (domestic) deposit insurance fund, intervention behavior will tend to be tougher as the deposit
insurer will try to maximize returns to domestic depositors rather than domestic equity holders. If the
central bank is in charge of intervention decisions, there may likewise be a tendency towards strict
interventions, if the central bank primarily cares about external failure costs. On the other hand, if
intervention decisions are taken by an independent supervisor, interventions may be relatively lenient,
in case of regulatory capture by domestic equity holders.
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However, for our comparative static results it is not important that the domestic regulator maxi-
mizes welfare. Proposition 1 continues to hold as long as the regulator puts a (positive) weight on the
returns of each of the stakeholders. The latter assumption seems plausible since many stakeholders
are involved in the resolution of large cross-border banks and one can hence expect their interests to
be reflected to at least some degree. Formally, suppose the regulator puts weights of D, E , A on
domestic debt, equity, and asset holders. Condition (3) in the baseline model then becomes
((1 D)Dd+(1 E)E(R d)) (1 )(1 A)Ac = (1 D)Dd+(1 E)E(1 d). (5)
Rearranging for  gives
b = (1  D)Dd+ (1  E)E(1  d) + (1  A)Ac
(1  D)Dd+ (1  E)E(R  d) + (1  A)Ac
. (6)
Note that for 0i := ii (i 2 fD;E;Ag) this expression is the same as in the baseline model
(equation (4)). It hence follows that the (signs of the) comparative statics for b with respect to i are
the same as long as @
0
i
@i
> 0, that is, when i > 0.
3.2.2 Endogenous Risk Taking
Our baseline model has abstracted from a risk choice of the bank. Such a risk choice can be introduced
as follows. Assume that the probability of success  (which is learned at date 1) is distributed on
[0; 1]. At date 0 the manager of the bank can make an effort choice e which (stochastically) affects
this success probability . Effort leads to private costs m(e) and we assume that @E[(e)]@e > 0,
@2E[(e)]
@2e
< 0 and m0(e);m00(e) > 0. We assume that the supervisor cannot commit to a date-1
intervention schedule and hence has to decide on the intervention in a time-consistent manner.
At date 1, the supervisor observes the realization of . Since effort at this point has been already
chosen, the regulator faces precisely the same situation as in the baseline model: taking  as given, she
compares the pay-off from continuation with the pay-off from intervention. In particular, condition
(1) readily applies and the interventions decisions are thus the same as in the baseline model. Hence
the comparative statics of Proposition 1 on which we base our empirical analysis, continue to apply.
However, the time-consistent intervention no longer leads to welfare maximization – even in the
domestic case. This is because the effort choice will generally be inefficient. As we show in the
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appendix, effort can then be either under- or overprovided.
3.2.3 Bailouts
In our model intervention in the bank takes the form of a liquidation of the bank. An alternative form
of intervention, which has been often used during the crisis of 2007-2009, is a bailout.7
Bailouts can be introduced in our model as follows. Suppose that instead of having the option to
liquidate the bank at date 1, the supervisor can decide to inject equity in the bank. Assume that if a
bailout takes place, the supervisor injects an amount of equity d in the bank, which is just sufficient
to avoid bank failure in case the project is not successful at date 2. We also assume that bailouts incur
some efficiency losses K > 0 to the economy, for example, because of the cost of public funds or
because bailouts distort financing decisions in the economy (in the absence of such costs it would
always be optimal to bailout a purely domestic bank as bailouts have no costs but can avoid the
external cost of bank failures c). In return for the equity injection the supervisor takes an equity stake
of  in the bank.8
The intervention decision in a cross-border bank is now subject to the following considerations.
In case the supervisor does not intervene, domestic pay-offs are the same as in the baseline model:
((1   D)d + (1   E)(R   d))   (1   )(1   A)c. When the supervisor intervenes, he incurs
costs of d +K at date 1. If the project succeeds, pay-offs for debt and equity are d and R at date 2
and if the project fails debt receives d and equity zero. Hence total domestic pay-offs at date 1 and
2, including the return on the supervisor’s stake in the bank, are  (d +K) + ((1   D)d + (1  
E)(1  )R+ R) + (1  )(1  D)d. The intervention decision is thus given by
((1  D)d+ (1  E)(R  d))  (1  )(1  A)c <  (d+K) + ((1  D)d+ (1  E)(1  )R+
R) + (1  )(1  D)d. (7)
Rearranging gives
K + d < (1  E)(d  R) + R+ (1  )(1  A)c+ (1  D)d. (8)
7For an evaluation of bank recapitalization during the recent crisis, see Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012).
8Governments may also interfere with bank operations after a bailout in order to scale down bank risk. This can be
interpreted as a partial liquidation of the project in the baseline model and would hence lead to the same comparative
statics.
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The left hand side of the equation is the cost of bailouts. The right hand side gives us the domestic
benefits from bailouts. They arise because of higher pay-offs for shareholders, (1  E)(d  R),
the government’s return on its stake, R, lower external failure costs accruing domestically, (1  
)(1  A)c, and higher payouts to domestic debtors, (1  D)d.
We assume that the bailout stake  is set such that the supervisor breaks even in expectation.9
Given that the expected return on his equity stake is R, the breakeven stake is determined by
d = R. Rearranging gives
 =
d
R
. (9)
Inserting into the equation for the liquidation threshold we obtain
K < (1  )((1  A)c  (1  E)d) + (1  D)d. (10)
Solving for the critical  gives us:
b = 1  K   (1  D)d
(1  A)c  (1  E)d
. (11)
Noting that we need K   (1  D)d > 0 and (1  A)c  (1  E)d > 0 for an interior maximum
for b (b < 1), it follows that b0((1   D)) > 0, b0((1   E)) < 0 and b0((1   A)) > 0. Hence,
Proposition 1 continues to hold. Bailouts thus lead to the same comparative statics as liquidation
decisions. The efficiency implications in the case of bailouts are also the same as in the baseline
model – which can be appreciated from the fact that in contrast to the two previous extensions of the
model, there are no distortions in the absence of cross-border banking.
3.3 Numerical analysis
The analysis suggests that the intervention decision of a domestically-oriented supervisor depends
in principle on the various dimensions of a bank’s cross-border activities. An interesting question is
whether the cross-border activities can also be quantitatively important for the intervention decision.
Only if this is the case, can we expect significant welfare losses to result from cross-border activities.
This subsection contains a simple numerical exercise, with the aim of providing some sense of
the potential quantitative implications of cross-border activities. For this we parameterize the baseline
9Including also the efficiency loss K for this will not affect the results.
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model and analyze the intervention threshold for different assumptions on cross-border activities. We
assume a return on investmentR in period 2 of 1:085 (thus a net return of 8.5% conditional on success
of the project) and a debt share d of 0:9. We take external failure costs in period 2 as c = 0:5. In Box
1 we report the resulting intervention thresholds b (calculated from equation (4)) for different foreign
activity levels. We consider four cases: a purely domestic bank and banks that have respectively 50
percent of either foreign assets, deposits or equity. Next to the intervention threshold we also calculate
the implied CDS spread at the time of intervention.10 We can see that under the chosen parameters
the critical intervention threshold for a domestic bank is 0:946. This translates into a CDS spread
of 536bps (by means of comparison, the average spread of 55 intervened banks considered in the
empirical analysis of Section 4 is 417bps). A bank with 50% foreign deposits sees a higher critical
CDS spread of 749bps. Next, we see that a bank with 50% foreign assets has a critical spread of about
637bps. Finally, we see that a bank that has 50% foreign equity has a critical CDS spread of only
284bps, suggesting a much stricter regulator.
A key implication of our analysis is that a bank with substantial foreign activities still can be
subject to efficient regulatory treatment – as long as its activities are balanced along the various di-
mensions. In order to better understand the trade-offs involved in achieving balance, figure 2 shows
the combinations of the cross-border shares for which the regulatory intervention is efficient (the
x-axis is domestic deposits, the y-axis is domestic assets and the z-axis (vertical axis) is domestic
equity). Above the surface the regulator is too lenient (domestic equity is too high given the banks
cross-border mix of deposits and assets), while below the surface the regulator is too strict (domes-
tic equity is too low for efficiency). We can see that the trade-offs between the various shares are
fairly linear and reasonable. For example, for most combinations of domestic assets and deposits,
there exists a domestic (equity) ownership share that avoids regulatory inefficiency. This implies that
achieving balance is feasible for banks regardless of how international they are. We can also see that
none of the three activity-shares is dominating, that is, each activity share can be offset by appropriate
shares along the other two dimensions.
10Noting that the expected loss at the critical value is (1   b)  1 and assuming that the CDS premium reflects the
expected loss on the underlying asset, we obtain a corresponding CDS spread of CDS = 1  b.
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3.4 Branches versus subsidiaries
Our model can be used to discuss regulatory implications of different organizational forms for inter-
national banks in establishing their presence in host markets. Banks have two main ways to undertake
foreign operations: through branches or by establishing a foreign subsidiary. The key difference be-
tween branches and subsidiaries is that in the case of a branch the supervisor in the country of the
parent bank has responsibility (home supervisor), while in the case of a subsidiary it is the regulator
in the country where the supervisor is located (host supervisor). Our model can be used to under-
stand the relative regulatory attractiveness of either mode of foreign entry in terms of their welfare
properties.
Consider first the case of a subsidiary. From the perspective of the host country regulator, the
subsidiary has a large share of foreign equity as the profits of the subsidiary will return to the parent
company (high E). Since the subsidiary will typically lend largely domestically in the host economy,
the share of domestic assets is, however, large (low A). In addition, the subsidiary might also
source deposits largely locally (low D). Thus, applying our model, from the perspective of the host
supervisor, cross-border banking largely takes place through foreign equity ownership. Corollary 1
tells us that regulation and supervision will hence tend to be too strict.
Consider next branching. Under branching, the home country supervisor has responsibility for
supervision and the intervention decision. This supervisor can decide to intervene in the foreign
branch but only jointly with intervention at the parent bank. We distinguish in the following between
two cases: i) the size of the branch is small relative to the parent bank and, ii), the size of the branch
is large relative to the parent bank. To focus ideas, we also assume that the health of the parent and
the foreign branch are fully correlated (in terms of the model: both have the same realization of  at
date 1), an assumption we relax below. In the case of the parent bank having more than one foreign
operation (possibly in different countries), relative size is defined as the combined size of all foreign
branches relative to the parent company.
Consider first the case where the foreign operations are small. From the perspective of the home
regulator there is hence effectively no cross-border banking. Her liquidation decision is hence unbi-
ased and efficient. In the case of large foreign operations, things play out as follows. Due to presence
of foreign lending by the foreign branches, there is a substantial part of foreign assets (A high). In
addition, there are also foreign deposits (D high), while there is no foreign equity (E low). Using
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Corollary 1 we thus obtain that the domestic supervisor is too lenient.
What does this imply for the regulatory desirability of branching versus representation through a
subsidiary? In the case of a small foreign operation, branching is preferred as this leads to unbiased
intervention decisions. When the foreign operation is large, there is a trade-off. In the case of a sub-
sidiary, intervention in the foreign operation might be too strict, especially in countries with effective
resolution frameworks. In the case of a branch, intervention is too lenient. In either case, this leads to
inefficient liquidation decisions both domestically and abroad.
Conclusion 1 . When (total) foreign operations are small relative to the size of the parent bank,
cross-border banking should take place through branching. When (total) foreign operations are large
relative to the size of the parent bank, either branches or subsidiaries may be preferred to obtain an
efficient intervention decision.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect correlation between  in the home and the host countries
complicates things somewhat in the case of large cross-border activity. If (1   (1   A))F + (1  
A)D <
b; where F denotes foreign and D domestic, the home country supervisor will intervene.
If the two s are sufficiently different, this might imply that external costs of failure resolution are
imposed on a country where the banking operation is perfectly healthy (i.e. high ). As the home
country supervisor internalizes only (1 A)c , the supervisor is more lenient towards negative signals
from the host countries. This can be further complicated if the home country supervisor receives only
a noisy signal about  in the host countries. While not affecting the intervention threshold, it will
increase both Type 1 and Type 2 errors and thus reduce welfare.
Comparing the regulatory effects of branch versus subsidiary structure with the actual decision
of international banks shows that banks with large cross-border retail operations prefer indeed sub-
sidiaries, while banks with small cross-border operations prefer branches (Cerutti et al., 2007). The
recent expansion of some European banks (e.g. Icelandic banks and Nordea) in the form of branches,
however, provides serious regulatory challenges, as we have shown in this sub-section.
In this respect it is interesting to note that our model suggests that banks may use branching
excessively from a welfare perspective. This is because branching leads to lenient intervention, which
benefits equity holders. In case where a subsidiary is the desirable form of organization from a welfare
perspective, there is thus a potential inefficiency as banks may have an incentive to form foreign
operations in the form of branches.
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4 Empirical analysis
The failure and intervention of Icelandic banks provide an illustrative example for our theoretical
model. The late intervention by the Icelandic supervisors can be explained by the high shares of both
foreign assets and deposits that Icelandic banks were holding, while equity was almost exclusively
held by domestic agents. The fact that a large share of deposits were collected through branches rather
than subsidiaries exacerbated the situation for host country supervisors as they had little information
and even less power to intervene in time.
In the following, we subject our theoretical model to a formal empirical test by exploring a sample
of 55 banks across 15 countries that failed and were intervened between 2007 and 2009. Specifically,
we use the CDS spread at the time of intervention as indicator of regulatory lenience or strictness and
relate it to the mix of foreign equity, assets and deposits of these banks, controlling for an array of
other bank characteristics. We first explain the methodology, before presenting the data and discussing
the results.
4.1 Methodology
In our model, information about bank health () is realized at a single point in time (date 1). This
means that the regulator intervenes whenever the realization of  is anywhere below the critical . In
reality, bank health will rather evolve in a more continuous fashion. This suggests that regulators will
intervene precisely when the health has deteriorated to the degree that the critical  is reached – at least
if the regulator does not perceive an option value of not closing down the bank. As a consequence, the
CDS spread at the time of intervention would be a good indicator of regulatory lenience or strictness.
An option effect may arise from the fact that a regulator may prefer not to close down a bank that has
reached the critical threshold because there is the chance that the bank will recover in the future and
end up above the threshold. Such a consideration would simply serve to reduce the critical threshold
at which the regulator intervenes – but the threshold would still depend on the various dimensions
of “foreignness” as outlined in the analysis of the previous section. Hence, it remains appropriate
to study how bank health at the time of intervention (as a measure of regulatory lenience) depends
on foreignness. Figure 3 shows the evolution of CDS spreads for the 55 banks in our sample over
the 90 days before intervention, normalized by 100 for the day of intervention. Consistent with our
discussion, the spread increases over these 90 days, with the increases accelerating in the weeks before
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intervention. Looking beyond the average, we find that for 48 of the 55 banks, the spread is higher
three days before intervention than 90 days before, for 45 banks, the spread is higher three days before
intervention than 60 days before, and for 37 banks, the spread is higher three days before intervention
than 30 days before. Also, when considering different percentiles in CDS spreads, as defined either
90 days before intervention, three days before intervention or on the average over the 90 days leading
up to intervention, we find that banks at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles see an increase over the
90 days leading up to intervention.
Proposition 1 (which was derived assuming that the continuation value of the bank mainly accrues
to equity) and the discussion above suggest the following testable hypothesis:
The CDS-spread at the time of intervention i) decreases in the share of foreign equity, ii) increases
in the share of foreign assets, and iii) increases in the share of foreign deposits.
We test this hypothesis with the following empirical specification:
yi = +   Fi +   Zi + "i: (12)
where Fi is a vector of cross-border activities (share of foreign deposits, assets and equity) and Zi
is a vector of control variables. The dependent variable yi is the log of the CDS spread (CDS) or
the difference between log of CDS spread and the log of CDS index for the region where the bank is
located (CDS spread relative to index). This second variable allows for the possibility that regulatory
lenience not only depends on a bank’s financial health but also on the general situation in the banking
sector. The set of control variables includes different bank characteristics that can possibly explain
the timing of regulatory intervention, but are outside our theoretical model. We include bank size,
defined as the log of bank total assets, as there might be a regulatory bias towards intervening large
banks too late, a phenomenon known as too-big- or too-complex-to-fail. In robustness tests, we also
use the share of bank assets in total assets of the banking system instead of its size. We include
the logs of the tier-1 capital ratio, as regulators face higher pressure to intervene undercapitalized
banks, while lower liquidity, as measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, might provide an
additional indication of fragility and thus trigger regulatory intervention.11 As an alternative to those
bank balance variables we also use the CDS spread of a bank 12 months preceding its intervention
11Some of these variables might be endogenous although we measure them at the end of the year before intervention.
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for robustness tests. We take this CDS spread as a proxy of the bank’s historical health.
In addition, we control for government ownership and timing of intervention. The considerations
when intervening in banks with an equity stake owned by the government are presumably different
ones and this is may be reflected in bank CDS spreads. For this reason, we use a dummy (State own-
ership) in all specifications which indicates that the government has a stake of more than 5 percent in
the bank. We also include a crisis dummy (Post-Lehman period) in our empirical model to isolate the
effect of Lehman Brothers’ collapse on CDS spreads – as this event has arguably increased pressure
on regulators to intervene weak banks. The bailout dummy takes the value of 0 prior to September
2008 and 1 afterwards. We expect to find a negative association of the Post-Lehman period dummy
and the State-Dummy with the intervention threshold.
Moreover, we include several measures gauging the regulatory structure of countries. The dummy
Central Bank takes the value of one if the central bank is involved in the supervision of banks and the
dummy variable Single Agency indicates whether more than one agency is involved in the supervision
of banks. As discussed above, we expect central banks to be more stringent supervisors when being
granted with such supervisory function. In addition, we expect that intervention decisions are more
lenient in the case of multiple supervisors, as coordination problems may make it more difficult to
agree on intervention. CDS spreads at intervention should hence be higher. In robustness tests, we
also use a variable that measures deposit insurance coverage relative to GDP per capita as a proxy for
the costs faced by national supervisors.
Finally, in unreported robustness tests, we also control for an alternative explanation for cross-
bank variation in CDS spreads. We use a measure of CDS liquidity defined as the difference between
the bid and ask for debt insurance of a particular bank (Bid Ask spread) normalized by the CDS
spread. It is expected that lower levels of liquidity will lead to higher CDS spreads. As a result,
the CDS spreads that we observe can also reflect a higher compensation for liquidity risk rather than
information about deterioration of bank financial health.
The table in appendix B lists all variables used in regressions as well as their definitions and data
sources.
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4.2 Data
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected bank-level dataset, which contains information on
cross-border activities of European and U.S. banks that were intervened during the financial crisis in
the period between 2007 and 2009. Our main sources of information on foreign assets and deposits
are annual reports and the accompanying notes to bank financial statements from the fiscal year pre-
ceding bank intervention. When data on foreign assets are missing, we use the share of foreign loans
or deposits instead. In a similar way, we use the available data on foreign assets and loans as a com-
plement for missing shares of foreign deposits.12 In the case of foreign equity, we collect data from
Bankscope on ownership by foreign shareholders. Since equity shares are likely to change quickly
within a year, the share of foreign ownership is taken at the last available time period prior to the
month of bank intervention.
Intervention dates are taken from the dataset compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2010), com-
plemented with own collected data. Table 1 reports the intervention dates. We measure regulatory
lenience or strictness by the CDS spread of the bank at the time of intervention. The idea is that a
higher CDS spread at intervention reflects that the regulator has waited for bank health to deteriorate
significantly before intervening, that is, her critical  is low.13 Such a regulator is lenient in the lan-
guage of our model. Conversely, a regulator who tends to intervene already at low CDS spreads is
considered a stricter regulator. We collect daily observations on five year senior debt CDS spreads
from Datastream before bank intervention. Ideally we would like to use the values of the CDS spreads
immediately prior to the first release of a public announcement on bank intervention. However, the
CDS spread at the day of intervention (or the previous day) may already reflect intervention expecta-
tions. In order to mitigate this problem, we use CDS spreads 3 days prior to intervention. As a bank’s
CDS spread might partly be driven by overall market movements, we use the difference between the
log of a bank CDS spread and the log of a CDS index as alternative indicator. A CDS index from
Datastream about the European bank sector is used if the bank is located in Europe and the Datas-
tream CDS index pertaining to the US banking sector if the bank is located in the US. In addition,
looking at the difference to the CDS index will also help to control for non-bank-specific risk factors
12The missing share of foreign assets is replaced with data on foreign loans and deposits in 3 and 4 cases, respectively.
Replacement of missing data on foreign deposits with available data on foreign loans or assets occurs in 8 cases.
13Recalling that  is the likelihood of project success and that the LGD in our model is 100%, the relationship between
CDS spread and threshold lambda is: CDS = 1  .
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in CDS spreads, such as economy-wide risk and liquidity premia. These premia have been shown to
be an important part of CDS prices (see Amato (2005) and Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2011))
but should in principle not affect regulatory intervention decisions. The CDS spreads and bank-level
variables in all regressions are winsorized at the 5 percent level and bank size is also taken in logs.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables included in our baseline analysis. On av-
erage, the cross-border activities of banks in our sample seem balanced - the mean share of bank
foreign equity is 35 percent and the average share of foreign assets and deposits is 33 and 32 percent,
respectively. There is a large variation in CDS spreads three days before intervention across banks.
While the mean (unwinsorized) CDS spread is approximately 417 bps around the time of interven-
tion, it varies between 52 and 3626 basis points across banks. The three major Icelandic banks and
the U.S.-based bank Washington Mutual Inc. have the highest CDS spread at time of intervention in
the dataset. On the other tail of the distribution, we have BNP Paribas and Credit Agricole SA with
the lowest CDS spreads at the time of intervention. On average, bank total assets are over 450 billion
Euros. The tier 1 ratio is, on average, eight percent and the share of liquid assets 21 percent. 16
percent of banks had state ownership before intervention and 67 percent of banks in our sample were
intervened after the Lehman Brothers failure. About half of intervened banks are located in countries
where a single agency is in charge of bank supervision and about 60 percent in a country where the
central bank has a supervisory function.
Table 3 reports correlations among the key variables used in regressions. The pair-wise correla-
tions between the CDS-based measures of lenience and the shares of foreign bank activities have the
expected signs but are not significant at the 10 percent level. The CDS spread for example is decreas-
ing in foreign equity and increasing in the share of foreign assets and deposits. The insignificance of
the correlation estimates may reflect that we need to control for various other factors that influence the
intervention decision. Next we look at the control variables and their correlation with our measures of
lenience. Bank size and the liquid asset ratio have a statistically significant and negative correlation
with the CDS-based measures and the expected signs, while the Tier 1 ratio has a statistically sig-
nificant and positive one. There is a high correlation between foreign assets and deposits suggesting
that their joint inclusion in regressions can lead to multicollinearity. Thus in regressions we either use
their average or include them in separate specifications.
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4.3 Results
The results in Table 4 provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses derived from our model. Here,
we regress the CDS spread three days before intervention on the various foreign activity shares,
controlling for other bank and country variables. In column 1 of Table 4 we fit a model that includes
foreign equity and foreign deposits while in column 2 the share of foreign deposits is replaced with the
share of foreign assets. Due to high correlation between foreign assets and deposits, we include the
average of both in column 3. In column 4, we fit the same model as in column 3 but also include our
set of additional controls.14 The coefficient estimates of the variables of interest have signs consistent
with the theoretical model. Banks’ foreign equity share is negatively associated with the CDS spread
at time of intervention, with coefficient estimates that are statistically significant either at the one
or the five percent level. An increase in the share of bank foreign equity by one percentage point
is associated with a decrease in CDS spreads around the period of intervention between 0.84 and
0.98 percent, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the coefficient estimates of foreign assets and deposits are
significant and have the expected positive sign and this is also the case when the average share of
foreign assets and deposits is included. One percentage point increase in those shares is associated
with an increase in CDS spreads between 0.78 and 1.3 percent. In columns 5 to 8 of Table 4 we
replace the log of bank CDS spread as the dependent variable with the log of the CDS spread relative
to the log of the regional CDS index as a measure of relative lenience. We confirm our results both
in statistical as in economic significance. We note that a better fit (as indicated by the R-squared) is
obtained for the regressions with the relative CDS spreads, i.e. our variables explain a larger share of
the variation of relative rather than absolute CDS spreads at time of intervention.
Turning to the control variables, we find that bank size is negatively and significantly associated
with the CDS spread at time of intervention, suggesting that regulators intervene earlier into big banks.
Banks that were intervened after September 2008 were intervened at lower CDS spreads, suggesting
a stricter regulatory approach after this event. Similarly, the negative and significant sign on state
ownership suggests a stricter approach of regulators towards these banks. In columns (4) and (8), we
also find that a higher level of bank liquidity is associated with earlier intervention. We do not find
evidence that the institutional structure of supervision matters for intervention thresholds. Neither the
14We include some of the variables only in column 4 as they are not available for all banks and thus reduce the sample
size.
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involvement of the central bank nor the existence of multiple supervisors is consistently significantly
associated with the CDS spread at time of intervention.
In unreported robustness tests (available on request) we included several other bank- and country-
variables that might be related to the CDS spread at intervention. First, we include a measure of
deposit insurance coverage relative to GDP per capita as a proxy of the costs that a regulator will
anticipate upon bank failure. The main message is confirmed (though we lose significance for foreign
asset and deposits in the regressions with the relative CDS index), while deposit insurance coverage
enters negatively and significantly only when using the CDS spread relative to the index as depen-
dent variable, suggesting earlier intervention in countries where deposit insurance coverage is higher.
Second, we control for the relative importance of a bank to national economies and replace bank size
by the share of bank assets in total assets of the national banking system. Our cross-border variables
continue to enter significantly, while the market share variable enters significantly in the majority of
specifications, with a negative sign when using the CDS spread and a positive sign when using the
CDS spread relative to the index. Third, we include our measure of CDS liquidity (bid-ask spread)
in the regression. While this variable does not enter significantly, our main findings continue to hold,
though sometimes at lower significance levels. Finally, we also estimate our model using as depen-
dent variable CDS spreads taken at different points in times before the intervention date. When using
the CDS coefficient two weeks before intervention, the coefficient estimates of the variables of inter-
est are of lower statistical significance, with higher standard errors. This is to be expected since CDS
spreads may then not fully reflect the deterioration in bank health that is very likely to take place just
prior to the intervention. As we move farther away from the intervention date, the significance of the
coefficient estimates becomes lower.
Next, we address the concern that the market may partly anticipate interventions. CDS spreads
before the intervention date may then not only reflect bank health but also the effect of the intervention
itself. This may bias our results if the anticipation effect is systemically related to the foreign shares.
In Table 5 we report results of regressions where we regress the difference between CDS spreads at
time of intervention and four weeks prior to intervention (the anticipation effect) on the foreign shares
and others controls. All the foreign shares are insignificant at the 5% level. Thus, any anticipation
effect that may be present is unrelated to the foreign shares and hence there is no reason to expect that
our results might be biased.
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We also test whether our results are driven by selection bias as our sample so far contains only
intervened banks. We use a Heckman model to control for possible sample selection, where the first
stage explains the probability of a bank to be intervened or not. For this we include next to our
sample of failed banks also 40 banks that were not intervened during the sample period. We use
the same controls as in the baseline model plus the loan-asset ratio and the ratio of non-performing
loans in the first stage; these asset risk proxies should be good predictors of whether a bank will face
problems and hence is likely to be intervened. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that
(past) asset risk affects the threshold at which a regulator intervenes in a bank, that is, the second
stage.15 Table 6 reports the first and second stages of the Heckman regression. The first-stage results
suggest that a higher share of foreign equity and a lower share of foreign assets and deposits make an
intervention more likely. Although not the focus of our analysis, we note that this is consistent with
Proposition 1 in that foreign equity makes the regulator stricter (and hence more likely to intervene),
while foreign deposits and assets make the regulator more lenient and induce him to intervene less
frequently. Critically, the second-stage results are consistent with our previous findings. All cross-
border variables enter significantly, with coefficients of similar size as in Table 4. Bank size, the
Post-Lehman period dummy and the state ownership dummy also enter negatively and significantly,
as in Table 4. The inverse of the Mills-ratio, lambda, is insignificant suggesting absence of sample
selection problems. Overall, the Table 6 results show that our findings are not driven by selection
bias.
In a further robustness test (available on request) we test the validity of our intervention model for
a sample of 25 banks that were not intervened during the financial crisis and for which we have also
CDS spread data available. If our model provides a reasonable description of intervention thresholds,
the spreads of non-intervened banks should tend to be below their predicted intervention threshold.
We test this by calculating the predicted intervention thresholds for non-intervened banks (using the
estimated coefficients from regression 3 in Table 3). We then compare these predicted spreads to
the actual spreads of these banks during the sample period. On average, 98 percent of daily spreads
are below predicted spreads before Lehman Brothers’ collapse and about 87 percent afterwards. For
many banks, 100 percent of CDS spreads are below the predicted intervention threshold, with a few
outliers, such as the Spanish Banco Popular, Barclays and the US financial conglomerate MetLife Inc.
15The intervention threshold (right hand side of equation (4)) depends only on the foreign activity shares, debt and failure
costs but not on asset risk at date 0.
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that have a substantial period with CDS spreads above the predicted threshold after Lehman Brothers’
failure. Overall, this lends support to our empirical specification of the intervention decision since the
model (when estimated on intervened banks) tends to predict that non-intervened banks’ CDS spreads
are below the intervention threshold.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper uses a simple model to illustrate the trade-offs involved when intervening in cross-border
banks. We show that foreign assets and deposits, on the one hand, and foreign equity, on the other
hand, have different implications for the intervention decisions of home country regulators. Critically,
a mix of the three can lead to the same intervention threshold as a purely domestic bank. Our model
can inform both the discussion on national versus supra-national bank supervision and the discussion
on the optimal organization of cross-border activity from the regulator’s viewpoint. While regulators
may not want to directly control imbalances in cross-border activities of individual banks, it should be
the task of the European Systemic Risk Board to monitor such imbalances since they lead to inefficient
supervision of banks.
Our empirical analysis using a sample of intervened banks during the recent crisis confirms the
predictions of the model. Banks with a higher share of foreign equity were intervened relatively early
as their financial health deteriorated, while banks with a high share of foreign deposits and assets were
intervened relatively late. These results clearly support the prediction of the theoretical model that
national regulators have biased incentives when dealing with cross-border banks. The message that
emerges has obvious implications for the ongoing debate on the reform of resolution regimes around
the world.
A supra-national supervisor could, in principle, always improve welfare because this supervisor
would also take into account the effects that materialize outside the country. However, supra-national
supervision might itself also be subject to imperfections. First, a global supervisor may have imper-
fect knowledge about the success probability at date 1, receiving only a noisy signal.16 This means
that the supra-national supervisor, even though having the correct incentives, will make sometimes
wrong decisions due to imperfect knowledge of the success probability. The benefits from dele-
gation to a supra-national supervisor (arising because it avoids the distorted incentives of domestic
16See Holthausen and Ronde (2002) for a similar argumentation.
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supervision) thus have to be weighed against the costs arising because the global supervisor has an
informational disadvantage. Second, the external costs from failure in period 2 might be higher for
the affected economies under supra-national supervision, as intervening and resolving a bank that is
present in markets with different legal frameworks can result in lengthy and costly resolution. Again,
this presents an additional cost to supranational supervision.
Our theoretical and empirical analyses can also be seen in the broader context of a trilemma
of financial integration (Schoenmaker, 2010) that states that financial integration, financial stability
and national sovereignty in bank regulation cannot be achieved simultaneously and one has to give.
We have shown – both theoretically and empirically – that this is the case due to imbalances in
multinational banks. Presuming that one wants to maintain financial stability, the options are hence
either a move towards national banking systems, with stand-alone, fire-walled subsidiaries or a move
towards supra-national supervision, with the caveats mentioned above. Such a regime can in principle
improve the failure resolution for imbalanced banks.
However, one condition for this is that the jurisdiction of the supra-national supervisor corre-
sponds to the geographical area of bank activities. As shown by Osterloo and Schoenmaker (2007)
and Schoenmaker (2010), the largest 25 European have, on average, 25% of their assets outside their
home country in other European countries. This share ranges from two percent in the case of BBVA
(which has 31% of assets outside Europe) to the Nordea Group, with 74% of assets outside its home
countries in other European countries (and no assets outside Europe). A European-level supervisor
can only alleviate distortions to the extent that they arise from imbalances within the Europe – but not
the ones arising from external imbalances. In addition, such a supervisor can only improve on a purely
national resolution framework if equipped with the necessary means and resources to resolve a bank
efficiently. The resolution powers also have to come with the necessary supervision and monitoring
tools; a close relationship with national supervisors is therefore critical.
Different institutional options have been discussed for a European-level bank supervisor. Allen
et al. (2011) suggest to combine the functions of deposit insurance and resolution for large Euro-
pean cross-border banks within a European equivalent of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Such an institution could operate either in parallel to the European Banking Authority (EBA)
or be merged with it. An alternative suggestion would be a choice-based model where EU member
states can opt to delegate supervision of their largest banks to the ECB. Such a model allows for more
27
flexibility and is likely to face less political resistance than the creation of a pan-European institution
(Hertig et al. 2010).
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Appendix A: Efficiency of Effort Provision
In this appendix we analyze the bank’s effort choice that arises when regulators act in a time-consistent
manner at date 1 and compare this to the (socially) efficient effort choice.
Denote with  the intervention decision of the regulator in a domestic bank (as we have argued
before, this threshold is identical to equation (2) of the baseline model). Bank effort is determined
as follows. The pay-off to bank equity is 1   d in the case of intervention and R   d in the case of
project success. In the case of failure the pay-off is zero. We hence have for bank effort:
eB = argmax
e
WB(e) = (1  d)E[(e) < ] + E[(e)(R  d) j (e)  ] (13)
The first order condition for bank effort is
WB0(e) = (E[(e) j (e)  ](R  d)  (1  d))@E[(e)  
]
@e
+ (R  d)@E[(e) j (e)  
]
@e
 m0(e) = 0:
The first term is the benefit from higher effort because the bank can now continue in more states of
the world (this effect arises because the bank takes into account that its own effort choice affects the
regulatory decision). The second term is the benefit arising because when the bank can continue,
average  will be higher. The third terms are the effort costs.
By contrast, efficient effort in the economy maximizes welfare. Given that payoffs are the same as
in the baseline model – except that we also have to take into account the effort costs m(e)) – efficient
effort solves
e = argmax
e
W (e) = E[(e) < ] + E[(e)R  (1  (e))c j (e)  ] m(e). (14)
The efficiency condition is hence
W 0(e) = (E[(e) j (e)  ](R+ c)  c  1)@E[(e)  
]
@e
+
@E[(e) j (e)  ]
@e
(R+ c) m0(e) = 0:
The first term is the effect that arises because a change in effort affects also the optimal liquidation
threshold. This effect is zero due to the envelope theorem. The condition hence simplifies to
W 0(e) =
@E[(e) j (e)  ]
@e
(R+ c) m0(e) = 0: (15)
Note that W 0(e) is larger than the term @E[(e)j(e)
]
@e (R  d) in WB0(e). Intuitively, this is because
a bank does not take into account that higher effort has benefits for depositors and asset holders.
However, the condition for private optimality has also the term, (E[(e) j (e)  ](R  d)  (1 
d))@E[(e)
]
@e . This term is positive because higher effort increases the likelihood that the bank can
continue, which increases bank pay-off (but not welfare since at the  the economy is indifferent to
continuation). There are thus two offsetting effects. Effort can hence be either under- or overprovided
even in an economy without cross-border banking.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Variable name Description Source
CDS spread CDS spread of a bank 3 days before in-
tervention; in logs and winsorized at the 5
percent level
Datastream
CDS spread relative to index Difference between bank CDS spread 3
days before intervention and CDS spread
index about the region where the bank is
located; in logs and winsorized at the 5 per-
cent level
Datastream
Foreign ownership Share of bank foreign ownership Bankscope
Foreign assets Share of bank foreign assets Annual reports and authors’
own collected data
Foreign deposits Share of bank foreign deposits Annual reports and authors’
own collected data
Size (in mil. EUR) Total assets; in logs and winsorized at the
5 percent level
Bankscope
Liquid assets Ratio of liquid assets over total assets win-
sorized at the 5 percent level
Bankscope
Tier 1 ratio Tier 1 capital ratio winsorized at the 5 per-
cent level
Bankscope
Post-Lehman period A monthly dummy that takes the value of
1 after Lehman Brother’s collapse in Sep-
tember 2008, and 0 otherwise
Authors ’ calculations
State ownership A dummy that takes the value of 1 if a gov-
ernment has a stake in a bank of more than
5 percent, and 0 otherwise
Bankscope
Central bank A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
central bank supervises banks, and 0 other-
wise
World Bank’s Banking Reg-
ulation Survey (June 2008),
question 12.1.1, Barth et al.
(2008)
Single agency A dummy that takes the value of 1 if there
is a single agency to supervise banks & fi-
nancial institutions in a given country, and
0 otherwise
World Bank’s Banking Reg-
ulation Survey (June 2008),
question 12.1.4, , Barth et al.
(2008)
Note: This table provides an overview of definitions and sources of all variables used in the empirical analysis. Bank balance
sheet variables are from the last fiscal period prior to bank intervention. BankScope denotes Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope
database and Datastream - Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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Box 1: Implied Intervention Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fully domestic 50% For. deposits 50% For. assets 50% For. equity
Foreign deposits 1 0.5 1 1
Foreign assets 1 1 0.5 1
Foreign equity 1 1 1 0.5
Lambda 0.946 0.925 0.936 0.972
CDS spread (in basis points) 536 749 637 285
Note: Box 1 reports the intervention threshold for bank with different degrees of cross-border activities.
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Figure 1: Cross-Border Banking in European Union
Note: This figure shows the share of foreign banks among total banks in the European Union between 1995 and
2009. Source: Claessens and van Horen (2012)
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Figure 2: Efficient Regulatory Intervention
Note: This graph shows the combination of the three domestic shares (given by 1 minus the foreign share) for which regulatory
intervention is efficient. The estimation is based on the parameter values listed in Box 1. X-axis is domestic deposits, y-axis
is domestic assets, z-axis (verical axis) is domestic equity. Above the surface the regulator is too lenient (domestic equity is
too high given the bank’s cross-border mix of deposits and assets), while below the surface the regulator is too strict (domestic
equity is too low for efficiency).
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Figure 3: Average CDS Spread before Intervention
Note: This figure shows the average daily CDS spread of the 55 failed banks in our database
up to 90 days before being intervened. The average CDS spread at any given day is scaled
relative to the average CDS spread at the time of intervention. We use CDS spreads 3 days
before intervention as the benchmark in order to exclude the direct intervention effect. Source:
Thomson Reuters DataStream and authors’ calculations.
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Table 1: List of Intervened Banks
Bank Intervention date Bank Intervention date
ABN AMRO NV 29-Sep-08 HSH Nordbank AG 3-Apr-09
AEGON Bank NV 12-Nov-08 IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 1-Aug-07
Alliance & Leicester Plc 14-Jul-08 ING Bank NV 20-Oct-08
Allied Irish Banks plc 12-Feb-09 Intesa Sanpaolo 20-Mar-09
Anglo Irish Bank Plc 19-Dec-08 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 13-Oct-08
BNP Paribas 20-Oct-08 KBC Bank NV 1-Dec-08
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 27-Mar-09 Kaupthing Bank hf 9-Oct-08
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 25-Mar-09 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 15-May-09
Banco Popolare 19-Jun-09 Landsbanki Islands hf 7-Oct-08
Bank of America Corporation 30-Oct-08 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 15-Sep-08
Bank of Ireland 11-Mar-09 Lloyds Banking Group Plc 20-Oct-08
Bayerische Landesbank 4-Dec-08 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 15-Sep-08
Bear Stearns Companies LLC 14-Mar-08 Morgan Stanley 27-Oct-08
Bradford & Bingley Plc 29-Sep-08 Natixis 31-Jul-09
Caixa Geral de Depositos 17-Dec-08 Norddeutsche Landesbank 18-Dec-08
Citibank NA 14-Oct-08 Northern Rock Plc 18-Feb-08
Commerzbank AG 3-Nov-08 Raiffeisen Zentralbank AG 30-Jan-09
Countrywide Financial Corp. 11-Jan-08 Royal Bank of Scotland Group 20-Oct-08
Credit Agricole CIB 20-Oct-08 SNS Bank N.V. 12-Nov-08
Danske Bank A/S 1-May-09 Société Générale 20-Oct-08
Dexia 30-Sep-08 Swedbank AB 4-Nov-08
Dexia Crédit Local SA 30-Sep-08 UBS AG 16-Oct-08
Erste Group Bank AG 30-Oct-08 US Bancorp 3-Nov-08
Fortis Bank Nederland N.V. 29-Sep-08 UniCredit SpA 18-Mar-09
Fortis Bank SA/ NV 29-Sep-08 Wachovia Corporation 29-Sep-08
Glitnir Bank 29-Sep-08 Washington Mutual Inc. 25-Sep-08
HBOS Plc 18-Sep-08 Wells Fargo & Company 28-Oct-08
Note: This table lists the banks in our dataset. The sample consists of 55 banks that have been intervened between 2007
and 2009 in Western Europe and in the USA.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2010) and author collected data.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Min. Max.
(unwinsorized)
CDS spread 55 338.74 201.6 351.40 51.7 1331 51.7 3626
CDS spread relative to index 55 0.31 0.24 0.80 -0.79 2.01 -.79 3.03
Foreign ownership 55 0.35 0.29 0.25 0 1 0 1
Foreign assets 55 0.33 0.33 0.24 0 0.90 0 0.90
Foreign deposits 55 0.32 0.27 0.25 0 1 0 1
Size (in mil. EUR) 55 456,541 309,476 389,052 5,528 1,306,283 5,528 2,586,701
Single agency 55 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 0 1
Central bank 55 0.58 1 0.50 0 1 0 1
Tier 1 ratio 49 .08 .08 .01 .06 .12 0.05 0.21
Liquid assets 55 .21 .20 .12 .04 .40 0.01 0.57
Post-Lehman period 55 0.67 1 0.47 0 1 0 1
State ownership 55 0.16 0 0.37 0 1 0 1
Note: This table lists summary statistics of the key variables used in regressions. Definitions and sources of variables are listed
in Appendix B. Bank level variables are reported after being winsorized at the 5 percent level on both tails of the distribution
and before being taken in logs. The last two columns of the table show the minimum and maximum values of each variable
before being winsorized.
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Table 5: Anticipation Effect
4CDS spread
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign ownership 0.399 0.379 0.403
0.266 0.257 0.260
Foreign deposits -0.343
0.254
Foreign assets -0.110
0.300
Average foreign asset and deposit share -0.269
0.307
Size 0.139 0.143 0.143
0.0852 0.0860 0.0869
Post-Lehman period 0.632*** 0.603*** 0.619***
0.123 0.119 0.121
State ownership -0.0705 -0.0777 -0.0650
0.128 0.133 0.128
Single agency -0.0480 -0.0354 -0.0421
0.116 0.118 0.116
Central bank -0.100 -0.0377 -0.0682
0.101 0.106 0.105
Constant -2.242** -2.375** -2.323**
1.069 1.068 1.074
Observations 55 55 55
R-squared 0.473 0.454 0.463
Note: In this table, the dependent variables is the difference between bank CDS spread 3 days before
intervention and its value four weeks in advance. Definitions and sources of variables are listed in Ap-
pendix B. Bank balance sheet regressors are based on data from the last fiscal year before intervention.
All models report OLS estimates with robust standard errors and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five
and ten percent level of significance
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